Tag Archives: monetary models

Systemic Risk

Yesterday I noted how Canadian mortgage company Home Capital ran into serious problems because of one of the more notable aspects of our financial system.

Fractional reserves or capital reserves let you lend money on deposit, keeping only a small amount of readily availabe cash to cover withdrawals.

This enables the lender to earn money on the deposits, pay the depositor an income and keep a profit for themselves. It also helps the economy grow more quickly by expanding the money supply.

So basically a good idea, but not without risks.  As long as depositors do not withdraw more money than is in reserve (say 10 %) or withdraw at a rate faster than the reserve can be replenished, the system chugs along happily.

Also of course if the loan default rate is high (say more than 2 to 3%) the ability to replenish and maintain the reserves is impacted and the house of cards can come tumbling down.

In the case of Home Capital, deposit holders began to panic.  The panic led to depositers making withdrawals.  A combination of factors created the perfect storm that led to this “run” on the Bank.

Home Capital focuses on higher risk mortgage borrowers and their executive were recently charged with a security violation and their stock is heavily shorted.  Short sellers were encouaging panic and the combination of factors made them successful.

In this case, the worst is over for the moment and we all can breathe a sigh of relief this did not turn into a systemic problem leading to contagion (i.e., a run on multiple banks).

The question for tomorrow’s post, since we fully aware of the potentially fatal and disastrous impacts that can arise from our fractional reserve/ fractional capital system,  why don’t we do something about it?

Fractional Reserves in Action

In the past, I have done a few posts about the concept of  fractional reserves or closley related capital reserves.  Canadian company Home Capital is a recent shining example of what can happen when your monetary system is founded on the concept of reserves.

Simply put, in countries that allow fractional or capital reserves; as long as financial institutions retain a government/regulator specified reserve of capital or specified deposit holdings, they can lend the rest.

For Example -Home Capital

Home Capital gathers funding via savings accounts, gauranteed investment certificates and shareholder capital.  At the end of April they had about $15 billion on deposit and $17 billion in mortgages.

The deposits were used to fund the loans.  Under the capital reserve model (Canada’s model) Home Capital is able to lend more than they have on deposit as long as the capital reserves (readily available cash on hand) are enough to cover a reasonable rate of withdrawal.

The reserve amount is set by the government based on the risk weighting of capital employed.  The idea is the amount of liquid cash on hand will cover the normal volume of withdrawals.

This all goes to hell in a handbasket when there is a run of withdrawals.  Since the majority of the deposits have been lent out as mortgages, a high and rapid volume of withdrawals can cause Home Capital  to run out of cash and default on the depositors.

And this is what exactly happened – the running out of cash part, not the default part, at least not yet.

Stay Tuned

There is a lot more to tell about this story and the saga will continue tommorow with some analysis on the triggers, what’s been done about it so far and what it says about the fractional / capital reserve monetary model.